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PROGRESSIVE POLICY-MAKING ON THE LOCAL LEVEL:
RETHINKING TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FEDERALISM
by MATTHEW J. PARLOW*
INTRODUCTION
In his oft-quoted and famous dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis stated that "[i]t is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' This theme is very much alive
in contemporary discourse and scholarship--as evidenced by the Symposium held
by this Law Review.2 And while states may indeed be fertile grounds for policy
innovation, one must question whether states continue to be the best level of
government at which to engage in such experimentation. Instead, local
governments3 may prove even more fruitful agents for social change and policy
innovation than the state or federal levels of government. After all, conceptually
speaking, the principles underlying federalism seem logically to apply not only to
the relationship between the federal government and the states, but also to that
between the states and local governments. Accordingly, this Article aims to further
explore the idea of further decentralization of policy-making to the local level and
the attendant challenges and tensions that such a notion begets.
Part I of this Article discusses why local governments are critical components
of our federal system and why they embody the values of federalism. Part II will
detail how local governments have been trailblazers in many areas of progressive
policy-making. Part III analyzes why, despite their importance in our
* Assistant Professor of Law and Acting Director for the Environmental, Land Use, and Real Estate
(ENLURE) Certificate Program, Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A.,
Loyola Marymount University. I am grateful to Professor Janie Kim for her thoughts on this Article; to
Karl Crow and the editors of the Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this Symposium and for their research and editing assistance; and to the Chapman
University School of Law for its financial support.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Tammy Murray, Note, State Innovation in Health Care: Congress' Broad Spending
Power Under a National Health Care System Will Stifle State Laboratories of Democracy, 3 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 263, 266-80 (2006) (analyzing state innovations in health care reform); David A. Dana,
State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 97-107 (2005)
(detailing varying land use approaches in many states to develop brownfields).
3. In this Article, I use the terms local governments, cities, and localities interchangeably and
broadly to refer to local government entities. While there are admittedly great differences in the types of
local governments and their attendant powers, for the purposes of this Article, I narrow my focus to
those local governments that exercise a meaningful amount of legislative power over traditional areas
covered by the Tenth Amendment police powers. These local governments would mainly focus on
cities, towns, villages, counties, and the like.
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intergovernmental system, local governments' powers have been drastically limited
by a perhaps overzealous preemption doctrine which may run afoul of the original
intent of the home rule movement in state and local government law. Finally, the
Article concludes by questioning the wisdom of the current preemption doctrine
that limits local governments' ability to be Petri dishes for innovative policies that
might translate well to the state and federal level of governments.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' ROLE IN OUR FEDERAL STRUCTURE
A. Local Governments as Originally Conceived and Their Maturity
Local governments are not mentioned or even considered in the United States
Constitution. 4 Local governments were originally created by states and began as
small urban and rural areas, far from the cities and major metropolitan areas we
know and experience today.5 States created local governments-and, with many
forms of local government, still do to this day-to carry out the duties of the state
on the local level.6 Local governments were limited by Dillon's Rule, which
permitted localities to exercise only those powers expressly granted to them by the
states. 7 In this regard, courts and scholars viewed local governments as mere
administrative arms of the state.' From this view, local governments would not
seem to be promising forums for policy experimentation. However, as explored
further in Part III, the home rule movement aimed to empower local governments
in a more meaningful way where localities could exercise all powers not expressly
reserved by the state-so long as they were not preempted by the state
government.' This change, as discussed further below, provided hope for policy
innovations on the local level the way Justice Brandeis envisioned the states would
do in our federalism system.
Local governments have also transformed from the smaller urban and rural
centers when originally conceived to include flourishing metropolitan areas. Many
4. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1983, 1988 (2006).
5. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1096-97 (1980)
(discussing the power that cities and towns had before the Revolution, and the fact that many cities were
not incorporated at that time).
6. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
7. See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the
Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 101, 114-15 (2008) ("[Judge John]
Dillon promulgated the famous 'Dillon's Rule,' which established that municipalities were entirely
creatures of the state and had no inherent right to exercise any of the powers the municipal corporation
had classically enjoyed." (citing JOHN DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
9 at 21-22 (1st ed. 1872))). See also Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79 (noting that a state may modify or
withdraw any and all powers that it delegates to the local government).
8. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79 ("The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
[municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute
discretion of the state."); Frug, supra note 5, at 1112 (stating that one of the central legal doctrines
emphasized by Dillon was state control over cities).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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cities and counties are now significantly more powerful, socially, economically,
and politically than when they were originally created and their powers--or lack
thereof--originally devised.'0 In fact, one might even argue that cities' economic
strength, large populations, and political importance make them more powerful and
influential than some states. For example, as of July 2006, the city of New York,
New York has 8,250,000 residents; the city of Los Angeles, California has
approximately 4,000,000 residents; and the city of Chicago, Illinois has almost
2,900,000 residents--constituting the three most populated cities in the United
States." These cities individually have more residents than forty-one states,
twenty-four states, and nineteen states, respectively, as of the 2000 census.' 2 The
gross domestic products for these cities, as of 2005, are also quite compelling: New
York's is $11,330,000,000; Los Angeles's is $6,390,000,000; and Chicago's is
$4,600,000,000.13
Finally, local governments also warrant our attention because a significant
percentage of public goods, services, and regulation occur at the local level.' 4 In
particular, local governments provide essential services that affect citizens' day-to-
day lives: police, fire, library, trash collection, street maintenance, transportation,
water and power, education, and others. As one scholar notes, "The services
performed by municipalities are those most vital to the preservation of life (police,
fire, sanitation, public health), liberty (police, courts, prosecutors), property
(zoning, planning, taxing), and public enlightenment (schools, libraries)."' 5 In this
regard, local governments can be viewed as perhaps the most critical level of
government in terms of responding-through regulation, goods, or services-to the
needs and wants of its constituents.
B. Local Government and the Values of Federalism
Local governments may also have the potential to best embody the values of
federalism. Local governments provide opportunities for public participation in the
decision- and policy-making processes that are more difficult, if not impossible, at
the state and federal levels of government. It is far more likely that average citizens
may interact with their city councilmember or mayor than their state legislator or
governor, or their congressperson, senator, or President. Congress conducts its
sessions in Washington, D.C.-far away from most cities. State legislatures meet
in their state capitol, which is often inconvenient for those living outside of that
10. See Frug, supra note 5, at 1062-63 (discussing the limited powers of American cities).
11. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Population for Incorporated Places Over 100,000,
http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/tables/SUB-EST2006-0l.csv (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
12. U.S. Census Bureau, United States and Puerto Rico Population Estimates,
http://factfinder.census.gov (under "Population Estimates Program," follow "get data"; select "2007
Population Estimates" and follow "Geographic Comparison Tables"; then select "United States-States;
and Puerto Rico" and click "Show Result") (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
13. City Mayors, The 150 Richest Cities in the World by GDP in 2005,
http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/richest-cities-2005.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
14. ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY: THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL
PUBLIC SERVICES 10 (1977).
15. Id.
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metropolitan area. In this regard, average citizens cannot take advantage of
opportunities to voice their opinions at open meetings when Congress or their state
legislature considers various regulations and the like. 6 On the other hand, city
council meetings are held within the locality-usually at city hall-thus making it
convenient for community members to voice their concerns to their local elected
officials.7
More importantly, perhaps, many local governments offer meaningful
opportunities for public participation through various substructures of local
governments that aim to engage the public in the local decision- and policy-making
process: business improvement districts, neighborhood councils, and the like.'8
Such opportunities allow community stakeholders to dialogue regarding the issues
the city faces and then interact with their elected officials to help inform the
decision-making process. This type of public participation furthers one of the key
values of federalism: democracy.19
Because they are smaller in size, local governments are more capable of being
responsive to the needs of their respective communities because they are more in
touch with their constituents.2 0 This leads, in theory, to more responsive and
representative policy-making as local government officials make decisions
informed by the community's wants and needs.2' Moreover, because citizens are
closer to and more in touch with their local governments, they can better monitor
and hold accountable their elected and appointed officials and mitigate against the
capture of their local government by special interest groups.22
16. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 397 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism III (noting how average citizens are more likely to
believe that their voices are drowned out or ignored due to the greater number of constituents).
17. Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503,
505 (1997). See generally Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the
Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 16-29 (2004) (discussing the purposes and the costs of open
meetings).
18. See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts
and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366 (1999) (detailing business improvement districts);
Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New
Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 166-87 (2008) (providing an overview of
neighborhood councils).
19. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAw. 253, 258 (2004)
[hereinafter Briffault, Home Rule].
20. See Briffault, Our Localism H, supra note 16, at 397 (noting that participation is often seen as
being futile at the state or national level due to the large constituency, while at the local level where
constituency is smaller, "each individual can be heard and can influence a significant portion of the
community").
21. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277,
297 (2007) ("Smaller local governments also may be more responsive to constituent preferences.");
Matthew J. Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENY. U. L. REV.
1061, 1070 (2007) [hereinafter Parlow, Decentralizing Immigration Policy] (explaining why local
governments are more in touch with their constituents and thus capable of being more responsive to the
needs of their communities).
22. Parlow, Decentralizing Immigration Policy, supra note 21, at 1071.
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II. INNOVATION ON THE LOCAL LEVEL
Perhaps the most significant federalism value embodied in local governments
is the opportunity to be laboratories of innovation as Justice Brandeis envisioned
for the states.2 3 In many ways, local governments have led the way in many areas
of public policy where the federal and state governments have either failed, avoided
issues altogether, or been unable to reach an agreement because of the divergent
interests of their constituencies. For example, local governments have been on the
forefront of policy areas such as climate change,24 gay rights and gay marriage, 5
domestic partner benefits, 26 affordable housing,27 campaign finance and other
electoral reforms,28 health care,29 and term limits.30 Two other areas, local
23. Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 31 (2006)
[hereinafter Briffault, Local Political Innovation]. See generally id. at 1-32 (describing various areas of
local policy innovation, particularly in electoral reform).
24. See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and
Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1015 (2006) ("[I]t is the state governments that are actively
pursuing programs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and sequester carbon while the federal
government has adopted a nonregulatory, and, many would argue, a mostly do very little approach.");
Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8
CHI. J. INT'L L. 409, 410-11 (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1018310 (stating
that, in contrast to the federal government, governmental leadership in U.S. cities has been very
progressive addressing the impact of emissions on the environment).
25. See David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 115
YALE L.J. 2218, 2225-32 (2006) (discussing San Francisco's challenge to California's state ban on
same-sex marriages and contextualizing the case in a theoretical discussion of what latitude cities have
in enforcing the U.S. Constitution in direct contravention of state law); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as
Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148-53 (2005) (detailing
San Francisco's issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and exploring the possibility and
desirability of local government action in this policy area).
26. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic
Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 270
(1998) (describing San Francisco's uniquely progressive nondiscrimination policy which requires "city
contractors to provide the same benefits to employee's domestic partners as are provided to employee's
spouses."); Ryiah Lilith, Caring for the Ten Percent's 2.4: Lesbian and Gay Parents' Access to Parental
Benefits, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 125, 139-41 (2001) (detailing local laws that extend domestic partner
benefits to municipal employees).
27. See generally Cecily T. Talbert, Nadia L. Costa & Alison L. Krumbein, Recent Developments in
lnclusionary Zoning, 38 URB. LAW. 701, 702-05 (2006) (detailing local inclusionary zoning ordinances
and the results of legal challenges to them).
28. See Briffault, Local Political Innovation, supra note 23, at 2 ("[A] number of cities and counties
across the country have been actively engaged in examining and revising their local governmental and
electoral processes, and in experimenting with new forms of political organization. Many of these-like
alternative voting systems, campaign finance reform, term limits, and conflict of interest regulation-
can involve fairly dramatic changes in local politics and governance." (citations omitted)). See
generally id. at 4-15 (describing various local experimentation and innovations, including direct
democracy via initiative, referendum, and recall, nonpartisan primaries, proportional representation
electoral systems, semi-proportional electoral systems, instant runoff voting, and campaign finance
reform).
29. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE § 14.2 (2007), available at
http://www.municode.com/content/4201/14131/HTMUch0l4.html (providing uninsured residents of the
City and County of San Francisco with access to health care). See also Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n. v. City
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immigration ordinances and living wage ordinances, warrant further consideration
because they represent policy areas where the federal and state governments have
failed to meet the needs of their constituents and the local governments have
attempted to address the problems on a micro-level. However, as discussed further
below, such efforts have been struck down on preemption grounds by courts.
A. Local Government Immigration Regulation
Local governments have recently waded into the highly politicized policy
arena of immigration regulation.3' The proliferation of such laws may be due, in
part, to a perception that the federal government has failed to properly address
illegal immigration3" in a manner that the public deems satisfactory.33 Regardless
of the impetus for such laws, the past few years have seen more than one hundred
cities and counties adopt and/or consider laws targeted at illegal immigration within
their boundaries. 34  These local immigration ordinances fall into four main
categories: day laborer, employment, housing, and English-only. 35
The day laborer ordinances require those who hire day laborers to register with
their respective municipality and even display a certificate in the windshield of
their car.36 The employment ordinances seek to punish those businessES that
& County of S.F., 512 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/54dbe3fb372dcb6c88256ce50065fcb8/aff372e2cbda96
5a882573cb0070d2ca/$FILE/0717370o.pdf (allowing the San Francisco Health Care Security
Ordinance to go into effect pending an appeal on the merits from the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff).
30. See generally Danielle Fagre, Microcosm of the Movement: Local Term Limits in the United
States, TERM LIMrrs OUTLOOK SERIES (U.S. Term Limits Foundation), Aug. 1995, available at
http://heartland.temp.siteexecutive.comi/pdf/28804d.pdf (detailing how almost 3000 municipalities have
adopted term limits and the changes these laws have brought about).
31. Parlow, Decentralizing Immigration Policy, supra note 21, at 1061. See Karla Mari
McKanders, Welcome to Hazelton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and
What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6-20 (2007) (providing a more
in-depth analysis of local immigration ordinances and their attendant legal and policy issues).
32. In this Article, I use the term "illegal immigration" to refer to the phenomenon of persons
entering the United States illegally, as defined by our federal immigration laws, or who remain in the
country illegally after their permitted period of time to be lawfully present has expired.
33. See Joseph Chamie, Center for Migration Studies, What About the Illegal Aliens? 4-7 (Mar. 20,
2006) (draft presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America), available at
http://paa2006.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionld=60186 (citing public opinion polls
demonstrating that a majority of Americans view illegal immigration as a serious problem).
34. See Fair Immigration Reform Movement, Database of Local Immigration Ordinances,
http://www.fairimmigration.orgfleam/immigration-reform-and-immigrants/local-leve/database-of-
ordinances.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (listing pending and passed local immigration ordinances);
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Latino Justice Project, available at
http://www.prldef.org/CivillLatino%20Justice%2OCampaign.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (listing
pending and passed local anti-immigrant ordinances).
35. Parlow, Decentralizing Immigration Policy, supra note 21, at 1064-65.
36. See, e.g., VISTA, CAL., ORDINANCE 2006-9 §§ 5.90.020, 5.90.030, available at
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Vista,%20CA%200rdinance.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2008)
(requiring that "le]ach employer or agent who makes an offer of day labor employment or who hires an
individual to perform day labor employment" must hold a valid registration certificate and attach such a
certificate to the passenger side window of any vehicle used to transport the day laborer from an
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employ undocumented immigrants.37 These ordinances bar businesses that employ
undocumented immigrants from securing city contracts or business licenses.3 8
Some of these employment ordinances even affirmatively-and controversially-
impose a duty on businesses to verify the lawful residency and/or immigration
documentation of their employees.3 9 Similarly-and also controversially-some of
the housing ordinances require landlords to verify the legal resident status of their
tenants.' The more standard housing ordinances prohibit landlords from renting to
undocumented immigrants and impose fines for doing so. 4 Finally, the English-
only ordinances establish English as the official language of a city and mandate that
all city business-with certain limited exceptions-be conducted in English.
42
At the same time, other cities have advanced pro-immigration approaches.
For example, many cities have designated themselves sanctuary cities by adopting
non-cooperation laws or policies that make their boundaries safe-havens for
uncontrolled location to a work site).
37. In this Article, I use the term "undocumented immigrants" to refer to persons who enter the
United States illegally, as defined by our federal immigration laws, or who remain in the country
illegally after their permitted period of time to be lawfully present has expired. Others refer to such
individuals as "illegal aliens," as do our federal immigrations laws.
38. See, e.g., San Bernardino, Cal., City of San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance § 6 (2006), available at http://www.campaignsitebuilder.com/templates/displayfiles/
tmpl68.asp?SitelD=843&PagelD=12139&Trial=false (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) ("Any for profit entity
... that aids and abets illegal aliens or illegal immigration shall be denied approval of a business permit,
the renewal of a business permit, city contracts or grants for a period not less than five years from its last
offense."). The San Bernardino City Council rejected the proposed ordinance. The ordinance
subsequently failed to pass through the initiative process. Kelly Rayburn, Opinions Split on Effect of
Ruling on SB Initiative, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN, June 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
11211358. Other employment ordinances revoke city contracts from businesses that employ
undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., Riverside, NJ, Riverside Twp. Illegal Immigration Relief Act § 4,
(2006), available at http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Riverside%200rdin%2016%20&%2018
%20Passed%207-06.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) ("Any for profit entity.., that aids and abets illegal
aliens or illegal immigration shall be denied approval of a business permit, the renewal of a business
permit, township contracts or grants for a period not less than five years from its last offense.").
39. See, e.g., Suffolk, N.Y., A Local Law to Require Companies Doing Business with the County to
Certify Compliance with Federal Law with Respect to Lawful Hiring of Employees § 3, (2006),
available at http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Suffolk%2OCounty.pdf (requiring employers that
receive any compensation from the county to submit sworn affidavits stating that they have complied, in
good faith, with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a's prohibition against employing undocumented immigrants).
40. See Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance No. 2006-003 § 3 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/cherokeecounty-ordinance.pdf ("To let, lease or rent a dwelling
unit to an illegal alien ... shall be deemed to constitute harboring.").
41. See, e.g., San Bernardino, Cal., Save City of San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance § 5, http://www.campaignsitebuilder.contemplates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SitelD=843&
PageID=12139&Trial=false (last visited June 29, 2008) ("Any person or his or her servant, agent, or
employee who owns, leases, conducts or maintains any vehicle used to solicit day laborers is guilty of
creating a nuisance."). The San Bernardino City Council rejected the proposed ordinance. The
ordinance subsequently failed to pass through the initiative process. Rayburn, supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Res. No. 2006-130 § 3 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/Communication/Resolution%202006-130.html (allowing the use of
languages other than English to promote public health and where necessary to comply with federal and
state law).
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undocumented immigrants.43  In this regard, sanctuary cities mandate that their
employees not enforce federal immigration laws, nor cooperate with, or coordinate
with, federal immigration enforcement. 44
As evidenced by these polar opposite approaches, local governments have
entered the field of immigration regulation in unprecedented ways. As discussed
further below, the legal soundness for these laws-particularly the anti-illegal
immigration ordinances-is questionable. However, these efforts demonstrate that
local governments may provide fertile testing grounds for the rhetoric surrounding
illegal immigration that might prove or disprove, on a micro-level, some of the
potentially dispositive issues in the immigration debate. This type of local
government experimentation in the immigration field may prove valuable to inform
state and federal policy-making in the area.
B. Living Wage Ordinances"5
Many major cities have waded into the area of wage regulation, recognizing
that the costs of living within their respective jurisdictions far exceed the federal
and state minimum wages.46 This perspective is supported by recent studies that
suggest that the minimum wage fails to even meet the federal poverty level or the
cost of living in different metropolitan areas. 47 Moreover, the effect of wage levels
43. See Fair Immigration Reform Movement, Database of Local Immigration Ordinances,
http://www.fairimmigration.org/Iearn/immigration-reform-and-immigrants/local-leveUdatabase-of-
ordinances.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (noting cities designating themselves as sanctuary cities or
considering sanctuary regulations or ordinances, including National City, California; Miami, Florida;
and Cook County, Illinois).
44. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382-84 (2006) (describing the origins and
implications of sanctuary laws).
45. For more in-depth analyses of living wage ordinances, see generally Clayton P. Gillette, Local
Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1057 (2007),
analyzing living wage ordinances in the context of local redistribution efforts; David Neumark, Living
Wages: Protection For or Protection From Low-Wage Workers, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 27 (2004),
considering whether living wage ordinances benefit or hurt low-wage workers and their communities;
Rachel Harvey, Note, Labor Law: Challenges to the Living Wage Movement: Obstacles in a Path to
Economic Justice, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 229 (2003), analyzing legal challenges to living wage
ordinances; and MaryBeth Lipp, Note, Legislators' Obligation to Support a Living Wage: A
Comparative Constitutional Vision of Justice, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 475 (2002), arguing that living wage
laws are consistent with legislators' obligations under the constitution.
46. See Darin M. Dalmat, Note, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: The Legal Viability of
Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 93, 95-101 (2005)
(describing the history and interaction with federal efforts of state minimum wage laws from the early
1900s to the present).
47. See Alana Semuels, Poverty Line Poor Fit With Costs, Report Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007,
at C2 (noting that in Los Angeles, California, a full-time, minimum wage worker earns $15,600 per
year, while a single adult needs $28,126 to live modestly, and a single parent needs $62,393 annually);
Economic Policy Institute, Economic Snapshots: Snapshot for January 31, 2007,
http://www.epi.org/content.cfnwebfeatures-snapshots-20070131 (noting that a full-time, minimum
wage worker working forty hours a week for fifty-two weeks earns $10,712 per year-approximately
forty percent below the $17,170 poverty level for a family of three); see also Dalmat, supra note 46, at
94 (noting the inadequacy of state minimum wage laws-in excess of the federal minim wage-that still
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on American workers is exacerbated by another economic trend: the decrease of
well-paying, unskilled jobs.48 In this regard, millions of Americans are working for
a living, but remain under the poverty level as the value of the minimum wage
continues to erode. 49  Accordingly, many cities have adopted living wage
ordinances to address this situation.50 To date, approximately 140 municipalities
have adopted living wage ordinances.5 Living wage laws break down into two
broad categories: the contractor model and the "blanket" living wage laws.
52
Under the contractor model, local governments adopt ordinances that require
businesses receiving government contracts, and to a lesser degree, government
subsidies, to pay their employees a designated wage-or a combination of wage
and health benefits-in excess of the federal and respective state minimum wage.53
While these types of living wage laws vary slightly from city to city, most living
wage ordinances are similar in structure and application. Cities adopting the
contractor model of living wage laws define government subsidies to include tax
incentives, loans, grants, and other forms of public assistance.5 4 Employers subject
to such living wage laws can meet the heightened wage requirement in one of two
manners: by paying the hourly wage at the required wage level, or by paying a
lower hourly wage level plus a minimum level of health benefits.5 Moreover,
employers subject to contractor model living wage laws need only pay a living
wage to those employees working on the government contract, or to those who are
employed because of the government subsidy (depending on the jurisdiction).56
Many cities establish their living wage at a level to allow a full-time worker to
fail to put workers at or above the poverty level). The state of affairs for today's full-time minimum
wage worker contrasts starkly with that of a similarly situated worker in the 1960s and 1970s who could
provide for a family of three on the minimum wage and remain above the poverty level. Ralph E. Smith
and Bruce Vavrichek, The Minimum Wage: Its Relation to Incomes and Poverty, MONTHLY LAB. REV.
1, 26-27 (1987). However, by the 1980s, the full-time minimum wage worker's yearly earnings fell
below the threshold for a family of two. Id. at 27.
48. See Jared Bernstein and Lawrence Mishel, The Growth of the Low-Wage Labor Market: Who,
What, and Why, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 12, 24 (1994) ("The fact that wages are falling and good jobs
are being lost (and replaced with low quality jobs) leads to falling disposable income.").
49. Id. at 17-18 (noting that the average hourly entry-level wage as measured in 1991 dollars
dropped by twenty-five percent between 1973 and 1991).
50. Fair Immigration Reform Movement, Database of Local Immigration Ordinances,
http://www.fairimmigration.org/learn/immigration-reform-and-immigrantslocal-level/database-of-
ordinances.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008). To be sure, there are certainly other impetuses that may
lead cities to adopt living wage ordinances. See, e.g., Robert Pollin, Living Wage, Live Action Living
Wage Proposals Gaining Ground Across the Nation, THE NATION, at 7 (Nov. 23, 1998) (noting that
cities passing living wage laws did so in response to the failure of the federal government to keep up
with inflationary pressure, and to fight local budget cutbacks).
51. See Living Wage Resource Center, Living Wage Wins, http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/
index.php?id=1959 (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (providing the date and description of municipal living
wage ordinances to date and links to summaries).
52. Dalmat, supra note 46, at 99-100. See also Lipp, supra note 45, at 487-88 (providing a general
description of the variations in living wage laws).
53. Dalmat, supra note 46, at 99-100.
54. Lipp, supra note 45, at 487.
55. Id. at 488.
56. Neumark, supra note 45, at 28.
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support a family of three above the poverty level in the area.57 In addition,
numerous cities adopting such ordinances usually either index the living wage level
to inflation or increase it at predetermined amounts for subsequent years. 8 Finally,
cities adopting living wage ordinances usually provide exemptions to various
employers, such as non-profit organizations, new businesses, businesses that can
demonstrate a financial hardship, businesses with a certain number of employees or
less, and businesses with government contracts or government subsidies less than a
certain dollar amount.5 9
The "blanket" living wage laws regulate private sector wages within
municipal boundaries irrespective of whether businesses receive a government
contract or government subsidy. 6° There have only been a few cities that have
adopted blanket living wage ordinances: Berkeley, California; 6' Madison,
Wisconsin; 62 New Orleans, Louisiana;63 San Francisco, California;64 and Santa Fe,
New Mexico. 65 In the process of adopting these laws, the city councils found that
the cost of living in their cities was higher than federal or state minimum wages
provided, and that it was in their cities' best interest to address this economic
disparity.66 In this regard, these cities attempted to remedy a glaring problem in the
economic health of the city-something that the state and federal governments had
failed to address.
57. See id. at 29 (detailing how various cities throughout the country arrive at the figures for their
living wage laws).
58. Dalmat, supra note 46, at 100.
59. See id. ("A handful of local governments ... have enacted minimum wage regulations ...
exempting only small business and (sometimes) nonprofit organizations.").
60. While some cities refer to these laws as living wage ordinances, some merely refer to them as
minimum wage laws.
61. See BERKELEY MUN. CODE § 13.27.100 (2000) (describing the private rights of action for
employees in California to enforce wage laws).
62. MADISON, Wis., GEN. ORDINANCE § 3.45. But see Wis. STAT. § 104.001(2) (2005) (invalidating
the Madison minimum wage law). See also Kerry A. Burchill, Comment, Madison's Minimum-Wage
Ordinance, Section 104.001, and the Future of Home Rule in Wisconsin, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 151, 173-87
(2007) (analyzing the Madison minimum wage law and the preemption of the ordinance by state
statute).
63. NEW ORLEANS CITY CHARTER §§ 9-501 to 9-507 (2002), invalidated by New Orleans
Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 1098, 1108 (La. 2002) (holding that
the state law preempted the city from passing its own minimum wage laws).
64. See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12R.I to 12R.13 (2003) (outlining and enacting the procedures
for San Francisco's minimum wage ordinance).
65. See SANTA FE, N.M., CITY CODE §§ 28-1 to 28-10 (2002) (stating that the living wage for Santa
Fe was $8.50 in 2004; $9.50 in 2006; will be $10.50 in 2009; and will then be indexed to the consumer
price index thereafter).
66. See, e.g., id. (noting that the average earnings per job in Santa Fe was twenty-three percent
below the national average while the cost of living was eighteen percent higher than the national
average).
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C. Oftentimes the Fate of Local Innovation: Preemption
Perhaps unsurprisingly, local innovation is often thwarted by state and federal
courts on preemption grounds. 67 Courts have invalidated local illegal immigration
ordinances described above on preemption grounds, in addition to other
constitutional bases including due process and equal protection. 68 However, courts
have not held sanctuary cities' non-cooperation laws or policies to be preempted. 69
Living wage laws have avoided preemption from the federal government
because the Fair Labor Standards Act7° provides that "[n]o provision of this chapter
or any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with Federal or State law or
municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage
established under this chapter. '71 However, some living wage ordinances have
been preempted on state preemption grounds. While most courts have upheld the
contract model living wage law,72 at least one court has invalidated one such
municipality's ordinance.
73
The blanket living wage laws have been preempted by state law in two
instances: Madison and New Orleans.7 4 In Wisconsin, opponents of the City of
Madison's minimum wage law75 filed suit claiming that the city did not have the
authority to adopt such an ordinance. 76 A state court held that the minimum wage
67. See, e.g., Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 488 (Cal. 2004) (holding that local
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated state statutes and was not within the
municipality's authority).
68. See Parlow, Decentralizing Immigration Policy, supra note 21, at 1065-66 (discussing cases in
which the Supreme Court held that the regulation of immigration is an exclusively federal power). See
also Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (granting a temporary
restraining order based on the likelihood that the two of Hazelton's illegal immigration ordinances
violate the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520,
558-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding equal protection violations stemming from the Village's regulation of
day laborers),
69. See Parlow, Decentralizing Immigration Policy, supra note 21, at 1068 (discussing local efforts
for dealing with immigration policy).
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006). The Fair Labor Standards Act's historic purpose, ironically, was
to maintain a minimum standard of living, lessen the need for government aid to families, and prevent
disputes between employers and organized labor. Id. at § 202(a).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
72. See, e.g., RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding
city's living wage ordinance). This decision is also consistent with the history of local minimum wage
ordinances related to municipal contracts. See McMillen v. Browne, 200 N.E.2d 546, 547, 550 (N.Y.
1964) (upholding city ordinance that set higher wage standards for employees of city contractors). Most
courts recognize that such living wage requirements are contract terms and thus are well within the
purview of local governments' powers. Id.
73. See Mo. Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 7 WAGE & HOUR CAS. (BNA) 218, 232-34
(Mo. Cir. Ct. 2001) (striking down the city's living wage law on vagueness and due process grounds).
74. See Wis. STAT. § 104.001(2) (invalidating the Madison minimum wage law); New Orleans
Campaign for a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1098 (holding that the minimum wage was unconstitutional
under the Louisiana constitution).
75. MADISON, Wis., GEN. ORDINANCE § 3.45.
76. Burchill, supra note 62, at 156.
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law was a valid exercise of the city's home rule powers.77 However, not soon
thereafter, the state legislature passed Section 104.001, which prevented localities
from adopting living wage or minimum wage laws. 78
The New Orleans story is similarly disheartening from a localist's standpoint.
In February 2002, New Orleans voters approved the proposed city charter
amendment requiring employers within the city limits to pay their employees a
minimum wage exceeding federal and state minimum wage levels. 79 A variety of
business groups filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the living wage was
unconstitutional, and injunctive relief prohibiting the city from enforcing the new
law.80 The state district court upheld the living wage ordinance, but the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the law was invalid under
the Louisiana State Constitution because it impermissibly abridged the state's
police power.8" The New Orleans living wage ordinance, like many other examples
of local innovations in policy-making, was preempted by state law.
11. PREEMPTION, HOME RULE, AND A HISTORY LESSON
Local governments are critical components of our federal system, particularly
because they are the primary provider of the goods and services that affect our day-
to-day lives. Moreover, local governments have been more willing to advance
innovative laws and/or policies that the federal and state governments are unwilling
or unable to effect. Yet, despite their maturation from when they were originally
conceived, local governments still have rather limited law-making authority under
current law and are thus often preempted by state and federal law when they
attempt such local policy experimentation-as demonstrated by the fate of local
anti-immigration ordinances and living wage laws. This state-of-affairs seems to
77. See id. at 156-57.
78. See Wis. STAT. § 104.001(2) (invalidating the Madison minimum wage law). See also Burchill,
supra note 62, at 173-87 (analyzing the Madison minimum wage law and the preempting of the
ordinance by state statute).
79. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1101; see also Laura Gavioli, New
Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans: State Police Power Swallows Up
Constitutional Home Rule in Louisiana, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2003) ("New Orleans voters, on
February 2, 2002, strongly endorsed Ordinance 20,376 (Sept. 20, 2001), amending the city charter to
increase the minimum wage of employees working in the city to $6.15 per hour, or $1 above the federal
minimum wage.").
80. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1101; see also Gavioli, supra note 79,
at 1129 ("In the days following the citywide vote, two groups filed suits seeking declaratory judgments
on the validity of the city ordinance.").
81. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1101-02, 1108; see also Gavioli,
supra note 79, at 1129 ("After the cases were consolidated, the Orleans Parish Civil District Court
upheld the ordinance, finding that section 23:64 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes was an
unconstitutional exercise of the state legislature's police power and that the city ordinance was valid
because it did not interfere with any of the Louisiana Constitution's limitations on New Orleans'
municipal powers. On direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the court held that the city
ordinance was invalid under article VI, section 9(B) of the Louisiana Constitution because the ordinance
impermissibly abridged the police power of the state."(citations omitted)).
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run counter to the re-conceptualized notion of local government advanced by the
home rule movement.
Prior to 1875, most local governments were subject to Dillon's Rule. 2 Under
Dillon's Rule, local governments lack inherent law-making authority.83 Instead,
local governments only exercise those powers expressly delegated by the state. 84
Courts thus view municipalities as mere administrative arms of the state. 85 In this
regard, when a conflict arises between state and local law, the state prevails.
In 1875, the home rule movement began when Missouri became the first state
to adopt a constitutional provision in its state constitution to allow home rule.8 6
Home rule provisions enable cities-usually with a certain minimum population-
to set up their own local constitutions, called charters.8 7 Forty-eight states provide
these home rule powers to cities through either constitutional or statutory
provisions.8 8 Home rule provisions delegate all legislative power regarding local
matters to home rule cities except the authority for those areas of law and policy-
making reserved for the state. Home rule thus empowers cities to legislate in areas
of local concern, so long as their laws do not conflict with state law. 89 In this
regard, home rule provisions were envisioned as "mini-Tenth Amendments
designed to cordon off local matters from state intervention."90 Accordingly, home
rule provisions were supposed to provide a constitutional or statutory defense
against assertions of state preemptive power. Home rule cities, then, should only
be preempted by the state if they legislate in an area reserved for the state, or in an
area involving a matter of statewide concern.
However, state courts-after decades of only following Dillon's Rule-
continue to give great deference to state governments over local governments when
conflicts arise. Most state courts narrowly construe the concept of "local affairs,"
viewing the language as limiting a local government's power rather than reading it
as a grant of power.9 Moreover, state courts rely heavily on the implied
82. Dalmat, supra note 46, at 102. A few cities and counties continue to be subject to Dillon's Rule
today. Id. See generally supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing Dillon's Rule).
83. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2007). However, local
governments under Dillon's Rule may well have significant regulatory authority, as many states delegate
important powers to cities and counties. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2255, 2284 (2003).
84. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1990).
85. See id. at 24 (suggesting that conventional assumptions about state power and local
powerlessness indicate local governments are little more than administrative arms of their states).
86. Michael Monroe Kellogg Sebree, Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home Rule: A
Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 155, 156 (1989).
87. See, e.g., id. at 159 (describing Washington state's adoption of constitutional provisions
providing for home rule, which allow any city with a population of 20,000 or more to frame a charter for
its own government subject to the state constitution and laws).
88. Barron, supra note 83, at 2260.
89. Diller, supra note 83, at 1126.
90. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 392 (2001).
91. Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 19, at 264.
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preemption doctrine to strike down innovative local policy-making. 92  In this
regard, state courts will invalidate local laws, even when they do not conflict with
state law-finding that the state intended to occupy the policy field, even without
explicit language suggesting such. To be sure, some state courts have upheld local
government innovation as falling within local home rule power, even when such
legislation directly conflicted with state law. 93 Nevertheless, such cases tend to be
the exception to an otherwise (ironically) state-dominated home rule
jurisprudence 94
CONCLUSION
The preceding should not be read as advocating for localities to have the
authority to pass laws that directly conflict with federal or state law. However, the
narrow construction of home rule powers, coupled with the frequency with which
implied preemption is used by state courts to invalidate local laws, raises questions
as to whether we are foreclosing a significant opportunity to use local governments
as the forums for experimentation as Justice Brandeis once envisioned of the states.
A case germane to the living wage discussion above may prove instructive. In
1964, the city of Baltimore adopted a city minimum wage ordinance that mandated
an hourly wage greater than that prescribed by the federal and state minimum wage
laws.95 A group of tavern and hotel owners in the city challenged the law claiming
it was preempted by state law. 96 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the
minimum wage law was not preempted by state law because it did not conflict with
state law-as the required wage would by definition meet the state and federal
minimum wage-and because the state legislature had not expressly reserved wage
regulation as the sole domain of the state. 97 In supporting its holding, the court
relied heavily on the concurrent power doctrine:
Such ordinances must not directly or indirectly contravene the general law.
Hence ordinances which assume directly or indirectly to permit acts or
occupations which the State statutes prohibit, or to prohibit acts permitted by
statute or constitution, are under the familiar rule for validity of ordinances
92. See Diller, supra note 83, at 1140-57 (noting that all states except Illinois recognize a form of
implied preemption, and describing different applications of the doctrine).
93. See, e.g., Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 19, at 266 (citing Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990
(Cal. 1992) (upholding Los Angeles' adoption of a public election financing system, despite a state law
banning public financing in all elections)).
94. Compare Johnson, 841 P.2d at 991 (finding for Los Angeles and not the state of California in a
legislative conflict regarding public financing in elections), with Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 19, at
264 ("[Nlarrow judicial readings of home rule grants [often] try to convert phrases like 'local affairs' or
'municipal affairs' or local 'property, affairs, or government' into a language of limitation rather than a
grant of power."), and Diller, supra note 83, at 1141 (noting that all states except Illinois recognize a
form of implied preemption).
95. City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 255 A.2d 376, 377 (Md. App. 1969).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 385-86.
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uniformly declared to be null and void. Additional regulation by the
ordinance does not render it void.98
The court's reasoning resonates with the dilemma laid out in this Article. If
state courts adopted the concurrent powers doctrine when reviewing challenges to
local ordinances, more of the innovative policies proliferating in cities today would
be able to stand and their successes or failures measured and analyzed-thus
embodying one of the hallmarks of federalism. If the law conflicted with state law
or regulated in an area expressly reserved for the state, then courts should invalidate
the law. However, if the ordinance merely builds on a federal or state floor or
minimum, then courts should uphold the law under the concurrent powers doctrine.
This approach would require a broadening of courts' reading of the term "local
affairs" in home rule statutes or constitutional provisions, as well as a move away
from implied preemption. In this regard, home rule jurisprudence would enable
more experimentation and innovation on the local level, while still allowing states
the opportunity to carve out policy areas they want to remain exclusively the
domain of the state.
Local innovation will not always lead to desirable policy outputs or results.
Nor does local decentralization guarantee success. However, consistent with
Justice Brandeis' vision of federalism and with the concurrent powers doctrine,
local governments' experimentation-both its successes and failures-has the
potential to inform state and federal officials as to what laws and policies might be
translatable to the broader levels of government.
98. Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted).

